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Abstract
Does short-term debt increase vulnerability to ﬁnancial crisis, or does causality go the other
way, so that short term debt reﬂects rather than causes the incipient crisis? We approach
this question empirically by examining the banking sector in ﬁve East Asian economies
that were aﬀected by the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997-8. We put together a ﬁrm-level database
that includes information on banks’ debt obligations as well as on bank failures following
the crisis. We deal with potential endogeneity of short term debt by using certain long
term debt obligations instead. These are debt obligations that mature at the time of the
crisis, and therefore add to the bank’s vulnerability, but since they were contracted many
years previously, cannot be mistaken as an endogenous response to changing conditions or
expectations in the period immediately before the crisis. We ﬁnd that such debt obligations
that were contracted four years or more before the crisis have a negative, albeit sometimes
insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of failure. Our results are therefore consistent with an
interpretation of short-term debt as reﬂecting, rather than causing, distress in the banking
sector. However, our ﬁndings do not rule out the hypothesis that exposure to roll-over risk
contributed to bank failure in the East Asian crisis.
JEL classiﬁcation:
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The role of short term debt in instigating the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997-98 has been
the subject of some debate. On one hand, many authors in the international ﬁnance literature
have focused on international illiquidity, whereby long-term domestic projects were ﬁnanced
by short-term foreign capital, predominantly via domestic banks. According to this view,
the resulting maturity mismatch has created an inherent vulnerability to crisis. Essentially,
by refusing to roll over their loans, short term creditors can potentially turn an otherwise
manageable adverse shock into a full-ﬂedged ﬁnancial crisis. Thus there was a self-fulﬁlling
element to the crisis, since the accumulation of short term debt shifted the aﬀected economies
into a danger zone where a crisis equilibrium could emerge1.
On the other hand, a number of scholars oﬀer a markedly diﬀerent account, one that
turns the causality from short term debt to ﬁnancial crisis on its head. According to this
view, the accumulation of short term debt may be the optimal choice for borrowers who
experience a deterioration in the quality of their assets, and is therefore a symptom of the
crisis rather than a cause. In the context of banks in particular, this view of the East Asian
crisis has been expressed forcefully by Diamond and Rajan (2001a). In their model, domestic
banks serve as useful intermediaries between investors and illiquid entrepreneurs. However,
the banks cannot commit to fully repay the investors once a project has been completed.
This can be remedied by very liquid lending to the bank, since the threat of a bank run
that is always present with this form of ﬁnance provides the necessary incentive to repay.
In this setting, if the projects being ﬁnanced are seen as becoming less liquid due to an
adverse shock to fundamentals, the bank will ﬁnd it harder to secure long term ﬁnancing
from investors, and will increase its short term borrowing as a result. The accumulation of
short term debt in many East Asian economies prior to the crisis can therefore be seen not as
creating vulnerability due to liquidity mismatch but rather as a response to the vulnerability
of the underlying projects being ﬁnanced2.
1Contributions espousing this view as a major or ancillary cause of the crisis include, among others,
Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999), Rodrik and
Velasco (2000), Eichengreen (2004), and Calvo (2005). Obstfeld (1996) and Cole and Kehoe (2000) analyze
the earlier Mexican crisis of 1994 along similar lines.
2The models by Tirole (2003) and Jeanne (2004, 2009) also emphasize the role of short term ﬁnancing as
a discipline mechanism for borrowers.
2Which view is closer to the facts? Was the build-up of short term debt in East Asian
economies prior to 1997 a cause or an eﬀect of the incipient crisis? This paper is the ﬁrst
to address this debate empirically, using ﬁrm-level data. We construct a new dataset using
individual bank level data, which includes information on commercial banks in the ﬁve East
Asian countries most aﬀected by the crisis: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South
Korea, and Thailand. We have detailed information on these banks’ debt obligations as
well as their performance during and after the crisis. We are therefore able to link, at the
individual bank level, between a bank’s exposure to debt of diﬀerent types prior to the crisis
and the its eventual success (or failure) in surviving the crisis.
Given the theoretical debate, and in particular the ambiguous direction of causality, it
is essential to deal with endogeneity in a robust way. We employ the following strategy to
correctly identify the eﬀect of a bank’s exposure to roll-over risk on its probability of failure:
instead of examining the eﬀect of short term obligations on bank failure, we examine the eﬀect
on bank failure of certain long term obligations, those that are scheduled to mature during
or immediately after the time of the crisis. Some of these debt obligations (loans, short-term
deposits, and bonds) were issued many years prior to the crisis, and therefore cannot be
mistaken as somehow being part of a response to deteriorating conditions. However, they do
add to the bank’s overall need to roll over its debt obligations, in the same way that short
term obligations do, thereby increasing the bank’s vulnerability. Using these instead of short
term debt, we are able to accurately estimate the separate eﬀect of roll-over risk on bank
failure.
We ﬁnd that obligations initiated four years or more before the outset of the crisis, and
that had been scheduled to mature in or immediately after the crisis years (1997-2001), have
had a negative, albeit not always signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of bank failure. We
interpret this result as weakly supportive of the view of short-term debt as an equilibrium
response to worsening asset quality. Our results indicate that the issuance of a debt obligation
prior to 1994 that was scheduled to mature during the crisis years not only did not predict
failure, but may even have predicted success, i.e. that the bank would survive the crisis. The
Diamond and Rajan (2001a) view of these longer term obligations would be that at their time
of issue fundamentals seemed sound, so that creditors had no reason to prefer short-term
debt. Therefore it stands to reason that an increase in issuance of these obligations would
3not increase the probability of failure, and indeed may be a sign of conﬁdence. This is in
contrast to the alternative view emphasizing roll-over risk, according to which these longer-
term debt obligations should have increased failure rates, since they matured during the
crisis. It is important to stress, however, that our ﬁndings cannot unambiguously determine
whether the initiation of short-term debt obligations increased bank probability of failure.
It is possible, even likely, that elements of both explanations were at play. Our claim is
diﬀerent, namely, that in view of our ﬁndings regarding longer-term obligation, it is very
unlikely that exposure to roll-over risk was in itself the dominant factor. Rather, our results
suggest that starting in 1994 investors were expecting deteriorating performance from banks’
underlying assets, and were lending to banks accordingly.
There is a large empirical literature on the cross-country association between the accu-
mulation of short term debt and the occurrence of ﬁnancial crises3. However, as pointed
out by, for example, Froot (2000) and Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2004), a positive and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of short term debt should not be interpreted necessarily as supportive
of the short-term debt-causing-vulnerability story; without a convincing strategy of dealing
with the ambiguous direction of causality, it is no more than a correlation. Our paper is
the ﬁrst to our knowledge to examine whether the empirical evidence is indeed consistent
with such an interpretation. Clearly this would not be possible without utilizing data at the
individual bank level, which we assembled for this purpose4.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 summarizes the two approaches to the role of
short-term debt in ﬁnancial crises and clariﬁes what predictions follow from each. Section
3 presents the construction of our data. Section 4 presents our identiﬁcation strategy and
estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
3The results are mixed. Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Rodrik and Velasco (2000) ﬁnd that a high ratio
of short-term debt to reserves helps predict the occurrence of capital account reversals, while Frankel and
Rose (1996) and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000) ﬁnd that short-term debt has no predictive power for the
occurrence of currency crises. Berg and Pattillo (1999) ﬁnd an eﬀect for some of the East Asian countries,
but not for others. More recently, Jeanne (2007) ﬁnds that short-term debt has predictive power for currency
crises, but not for capital account reversals.
4Related papers which utilize micro-level data include Eichengreen and Mody (2000), who use data on
individual international bank loans to examine the pricing of risk, and Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006), who
use ﬁrm balance sheets to detect the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on debt maturity.
42. Short Term Debt and Bank Failure: Theory
In this section we brieﬂy describe the two approaches linking short-term debt to bank failure.
According to the ﬁrst approach, taking on short-term debt increases a bank’s exposure to
a run, and therefore the bank is more likely to fail. The second approach emphasizes that
short-term borrowing is endogenous and is potentially the only way that a bank in diﬃculties
can ﬁnance itself. Therefore any increased likelihood of failure is not necessarily driven by
short-term debt itself, but rather is a consequences the original diﬃculties.
2.1. Short-term Debt and the Vulnerability to Financial Crises
Chang and Velasco (2001) build on the framework of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), in which
banks ﬁnanced by demand deposits optimally bridge between the liquidity needs of depositors
and the inherently illiquid nature of investments. Speciﬁcally, they assume that one dollar
invested in a project at date 0 will yield r < 1 at date 1, and R > 1 at date 2. There is also a
liquid world capital market where the interest rate is ﬁxed at zero. Some depositors will need
to cash in early on their investments; there is a positive probability λ that they will turn
out to be ”impatient” and will choose to consume at date 1. In the model consumer type
is unknown at date 0, and moreover is considered private information at all times. Chang
and Velasco (2001) characterize the optimal allocation of consumption and investment under
these conditions, an allocation which prescribes a special role to foreign borrowing: in the
optimum, the bank will use foreign loans to repay depositors who turn out to be impatient
at date 1:
λe c1 = e b, (1)
where e c1 is consumption of the impatient type in the social optimum, and e b denotes new
loans extended to the bank in the social optimum. The bank anticipates this and therefore
does not borrow too much at date 0, so as to not run against the economy’s exogenously
imposed credit ceiling:
e d < f, (2)
where e d denotes date-0 borrowing in the social optimum, and f is the economy’s credit
ceiling. Clearly this is optimal: providing for the impatient depositors’ liquidity needs by
foreign borrowing is less costly than liquidating some of the project. A bank ﬁnanced with
5demand deposits can implement this optimal allocation: there is a truthful equilibrium in
which impatient depositors cash in early, and patient depositors wait until date 2 to withdraw
their deposits. the incentive compatibility condition is simply e c2 ≥ e c1, so that there is no
incentive to pretend to be impatient.
Of course, the bank may be subject to a run: if all depositors decide to demand payment
at date 1, the bank may fail. The exact conditions under which this may happen depend
on the extent of the banks’ commitment to foreign creditors. For example, if the bank can
commit to pay foreign creditors under any circumstance, then the portion of the project that
it will be able to liquidate in the event of a run is given by
l
+ = (Re k − f)/R, (3)
where e k is the socially optimal investment in the project. This upper bound l+ in turn helps
determine the degree of the bank’s illiqudity. The bank may be subject to a run only if
z
+ ≡ e c1 − (e b + rl
+) > 0, (4)
i.e. only if, in the case where all depositors decide to exercise their right under the deposit
contract to demand e c1at date 1, the bank is not able to raise enough funds, through new
foreign borrowing and liquidation, to honor all deposits.
A more relevant case is where the bank cannot commit to pay all of its foreign creditors,
which are therefore subject to coordination failure much in the same way as depositors. This
can be expressed as a refusal on the part of foreign creditors to extend new loans (in eﬀect
reducing ex post the bank’s line of credit to zero), or even recalling existing loans. For
some parameter values, such actions by some creditors may cause a bank run, in which case
creditors acting in this way are individually optimizing. Chang and Velasco (2001) makes
the important point that such behavior by the foreign creditors may instigate a run where
none would have happened otherwise. That is because foreign creditors’ susceptibility to
panic increases the bank’s ”run zone”.
To see this, consider the case in which the loans taken at date 0 can be recalled at date
1 at the creditors’ discretion. The bank then may face a run if
z
b ≡ e c1 + e d − re k > 0 (5)
6i.e. if the combined total of deposits and debt exceed the liquidation value of the investment.
Note that in the run equilibrium no new loans will be extended, since the bank is unable to
honor existing obligations. Now compare this to the case where loans taken at date 0 are
guaranteed payment at date 2. This pre-commitment prevents any coordination failure on
the part of the date-0 creditors, but this does not extend to new loans, since these are not
covered by the guarantee. The bank’s liquidation limit is now given by
l
a = (Re k − e d)/R, (6)
and therefore a run is possible when
z
a ≡ e c1 − rl
a > 0. (7)
It is easy to show that zb > za > z+: the more liquid the bank’s liabilities are at date 1,
the wider the ”run zone” becomes. Note that the extent of the loans e d does not matter for
the bank’s likelihood to fail, nor does it matter if they were originally issued as one period
loans or as two period loans. What matters is whether at date 1 the bank’s creditors can
demand payment or refuse extension of credit. If this is the case, it exposes the bank to
a greater risk of switching to a run equilibrium and therefore failure. This leads us to the
following prediction:
Prediction 1: Any debt obligation, regardless of original maturity, has a positive aﬀect
on the probability of failure on its maturity date.
2.2. The Endogeneity of Short-term Debt
Diamond and Rajan (2001a) rely on a diﬀerent theory of banking (more fully delineated
in Diamond and Rajan [2001b]) to explain the connection between short term debt and
bank failure. In their model, an investment project derives much of its value C > 1 from
the human capital of the project’s entrepreneur. This creates a potential hold-up problem
for investors, which is solved by ﬁnancing the project through a bank which has intimate
knowledge of the project. In particular, the bank can replace the entrepreneur, which will
result in a reduction of the project’s value to θC > 1. In essence, investors employ the bank
as their agent to negotiate eﬀectively with the project’s entrepreneur and in this way collect
payment, which cannot exceed θC. The bank, in turn, may wish to extract a rent in return
7for these unique intermediation and collection skills. In bargaining with investors, the bank
will succeed in extracting a fraction of the collected payment, say θC/2.
Diamond and Rajan (2001a) show that a system of demand deposits can prevent the
bank from extracting any rent. That is because the coordination problem of depositors
(which investors do not have) creates a valid disciplining device. Since the market value of
the loan is now θC/2, whereas deposit contracts amount to θC, an attempt by the bank to
re-negotiate its obligation to the depositors will result in a run. In such a case, depositors
will seize the loan contract with the entrepreneur and negotiate directly with her, as a result
depriving the bank from the rent it was aiming to get by re-negotiating with the depositors
in the ﬁrst place. Faced with the loss of its intermediation rent, the bank will not try to
re-negotiate, and will transfer all collected payments to the depositors.
Demand deposits therefore serve a disciplinary role in this framework. But it is the very
rigidity of this form of ﬁnance which makes it unwieldy when there is uncertainty about
the bank’s assets, since an adverse shock to asset value will precipitate a bank run. In
an uncertain world then, banks will usually be ﬁnanced by a mix of demand deposits and
investor capital. Diamond and Rajan (2001a) model uncertainty in project completion date,
where the probability of a date-1 completion is α. This implies that at date 1 the bank will
be able to pay to its investors and depositors the following:
1
2
max[αθC + (1 − α)c − d,0] + d. (8)
The ﬁrst term is the payment to capital, which is one half of the residual value of the bank’s
assets after all deposits have been honored. Recall that one half of the residual value is
retained by the bank as rent. The bank will be able to collect θC with probability α, and
with probability 1−α the bank will be able to sell the project for c < θC (the restructuring
value of the project). After deducting deposits (which are paid before capital), this gives the
residual value.
Suppose now that after deposits have been taken by the bank, the value of α suddenly
falls, i.e. the project becomes more illiquid. In this case the capital investors will have to
adjust the value of their investment downwards, since depositors are liable to run on the
bank at the ﬁrst sign that their deposits might be in danger. The relative ﬂexibility of
capital can sometimes prevent a run and allow the bank to remain open. Therefore in this
8framework ﬁnance by capital investment is problematic: not only does the bank extract
a rent from the investors, it also forces them to absorb drops in its asset quality. Banks
that are perceived has having less attractive assets will therefore ﬁnd it very hard to obtain
long-term investor capital, relying to a large extent on short-term loans that can be more
easily recouped. These banks naturally will be more likely to eventually fail due to the lower
quality, or greater illiquidity, of their assets. This leads to the following prediction:
Prediction 1A: Original maturity matters: Banks with relatively more short term debt
are more likely to fail, as their underlying asset quality is the reason for relying on short-term
ﬁnancing. However banks with relatively more long term debt will be less likely to fail.
3. Data and Summary Statistics
Our dataset is at the individual bank level, covering banks that were in operation in the
years leading to the crisis in the ﬁve aﬀected East Asian countries : Indonesia, South Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. We started our construction of the dataset by
extracting ﬁnancial data (assets, proﬁtability, etc.) from Bankscope, a publicly available
database that covers 28,200 banks worldwide. We have limited our search to data pertaining
to banks located in the ﬁve relevant countries, in the years 1992-2002. There are 415 banks
in the database that meet these conditions. The distribution of the banks across the ﬁve
countries is as follows: 112 in Indonesia, 76 in South Korea, 97 in Malaysia, 64 in the
Philippines, and 66 in Thailand. Next, for each bank in our dataset, we collected information
as to whether that bank has survived the crisis or failed. We made use of several sources in
order to collect this information, which we utilized in the following order:
1. First, we performed an Internet search using the publicly available archives of a daily
industry newsletter. The Asia-Paciﬁc edition of the newsletter - Troubled Company
Reporter - has been appearing continuously since February 19985. The fully search-
able newsletter reports events such as proﬁt and loss announcements, negotiations of
rescheduling of debt, government actions regarding a particular ﬁrm, etc.
2. Second, we cross-referenced any information found on the web-site with other available
5The newsletter archives are available at: http://www.bankrupt.com/TCRAP Public/index.html.
9sources. A number of authors provide partial lists of bank outcomes. In particular,
Arena (2005) provides a relatively comprehensive list of failed banks during the East
Asian crises, covering all ﬁve countries. Kim (1999) gives detailed outcome information
on most of the Korean banking industry. Chou (1999) lists Indonesian banks that were
placed under government control, and Kawai and Takayasu (1999) provide a detailed
history of bank outcomes in Thailand.
3. Third, we performed a general Internet search for each bank that is in our Bankscope
dataset. This additional step was especially useful in the case of surviving banks, since
these banks’ web-sites often would include detailed corporate histories, in particular
dates of mergers and acquisitions, as well as name changes if any.
In our classiﬁcation of bank outcomes, we deﬁne the failure of a bank if, within ﬁve years
following the crisis (i.e. no later than 2002), it meets at least one of the following conditions:
1. The bank is closed down by the government or one of its agencies (its assets sold or
declared worthless).
2. The bank is taken over by the government or one of its agencies, to be sold or disman-
tled.
3. The bank is forced to merge into another bank or a consortium of banks without being
formally taken over by the government.
Our classiﬁcation strategy is similar to the one used by Arena (2005).
We have found information that enabled us to classify 359 cases out of the 415 banks that
are in our initial Bankscope dataset. The distribution of these 359 banks includes: 109 in
Indonesia, 58 in South Korea, 91 in Malaysia, 53 in the Philippines, and 48 in Thailand, in all
2,488 bank-year observations6. The remaining 56 banks were dropped out of the dataset7.
To our list of 359 banks, we added an additional 52 banks for which we have been able
6About a quarter of banks (138) appear in Bankscope more than once in some years, presumably due
to the existence of multiple audits. We choose to retain these observations (607 bank-year pairs) to avoid
possible selection bias. Dropping duplicates randomly has no eﬀect on our results.
7Most of these are not commercial banks; they include central banks, development banks, and investment
banks, among others.
10to ﬁnd outcome information, but are not included in the Bankscope database. Our ﬁnal
data set includes 411 banks, out of which 212 banks meet at least one of our deﬁnitions
for failure8. Table 1 reports the distribution of bank failures across countries and along the
years in our sample. We see that the crisis was of varying intensity in diﬀerent countries, and
followed diﬀerent trajectories. Korea and Thailand were hit especially hard, with 82% and
74%, respectively, of the sample banks located in these countries failing by 2002. However
Thailand experienced a rush of failures in 1997 that subsided in later years (with a later peak
in 2001), whereas in Korea the crisis evolved more gradually, reaching its peak (in terms of
bank failures) in 1999, and gradually subsiding afterwards. Indonesia and Malaysia, both
with 44% of their banks failing by 2002, exhibit a pattern similar to Korea, with the crisis
reaching its peak in 1999 and 2000, respectively. The Philippines, the least aﬀected country
at 18% sample failure rate, also exhibits a similar pattern, peaking in 1999.
We augment our dataset using information on debt obligations issued by banks in the
ﬁve relevant countries. Our data is taken from the SDC Platinum database, covering all debt
issues in these countries from 1976 to 2002. SDC Platinum is a comprehensive international
data set that provides information about every debt obligation issued anywhere in the world,
including (depending on availability) the type of debt (bank loan, bond, note, ﬁxed-term
deposit, etc.), the terms of the debt obligation (original maturity, principal amount, interest
rate if given, currency) and information on the creditor or the market of issue, as applicable.
In order to capture as many banks as possible, we searched all ﬁnancial organizations in the
aforementioned ﬁve countries, identiﬁed by their ISIC code. Matching this dataset with our
survival data, we end up with 208 institutions , for which we have 1,839 debt issues9. In
matching the two datasets we allowed for the quite common occurrence of banks changing
their names, e.g. following a merger or an acquisition. The resulting dataset reﬂects the
state of aﬀairs in 1997 with respect to bank names and aﬃliations, so that debt obligations
that were taken by a bank which was then acquired by another before 1997, are seen in our
dataset as if they were taken by the acquiring bank. These banks are distributed by country
8Of these, 12 banks can be classiﬁed as government-sponsored. Dropping these banks as well has no eﬀect
on our results.
9Previous versions of the paper incorrectly referred to all debt issues in our dataset as bonds. In fact
a minority (706 out of 1,839) are bonds and notes. We thank Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti for drawing our
attention to this.
11as follows: 50 in Indonesia (of which 38 failed), 51 in South Korea (of which 43 failed), 26 in
Malaysia (of which 11 failed), 16 in the Philippines (of which ﬁve failed), and 65 in Thailand
(of which 55 failed). Given the comprehensive coverage of SDC Platinum we can classify the
banks for which information on debt obligations is not available as banks that did not take
on foreign debt during our sample period.
Table 2 gives summary statistics of debt obligations that were taken by banks in our
dataset. The vast majority of debt is denominated in foreign currency, of which by far the
most prevalent is the U.S. dollar: 73% of all debt obligations taken by banks that we include
in our dataset are denominated in dollars. In terms of amount borrowed, there is a great deal
of variance both within and across countries. In terms of debt maturity, however, obligations
by banks across the region are quite similar. This may be due to banks in all ﬁve countries
competing to borrow funds in similar capital markets. Given the cross-country diﬀerences in
timing and severity of the crisis shown earlier in Table 1, it is interesting that banks across
the region seem to have been quite similarly exposed to short-term debt.
As a ﬁrst cut of the data, Table 3 presents the diﬀerences in the original debt maturity
between failed and non-failed banks in our dataset. Recall that the panel structure of our
data allows us to examine ﬁnancing choices of individual banks taken years, and in some
cases decades, before the onset of the crisis in 1997. As Panel A of the table demonstrates,
failed banks issue, on average, debt of shorter maturity, however the diﬀerence in means
between failed and non-failed banks is small and statistically insigniﬁcant. We also ﬁnd that
the maturity distribution of debt issued by failed banks is very similar to that of non-failed
banks. The only diﬀerence we detect between the distributions of maturity is in the extreme
right tail: the maximum maturity of an obligation of a failed bank in our dataset is 15 years,
while the maximum maturity of an obligation of a non-failed bank stands at 25 years.
Panel B of Table 3 explores further the maturity distributions of the two groups, compar-
ing debt maturity by year of issue as well. As Panel B shows, comparing debt maturity of the
two groups of banks in the decade 1980-1990, we ﬁnd that failed banks actually took debt
of longer maturity than non-failed banks. However, when we compare obligations issued
closer to the crisis, we ﬁnd that failed banks issue debt of signiﬁcantly shorter maturities.
It is interesting to note that the average debt maturity of both groups declined in the 1990s
relative to the 1980s, potentially reﬂecting lenders’ concerns about East Asian economies.
12Furthermore, debt maturities of banks that eventually failed during the East Asian crisis
declined more relative to those that did not fail.
The results in Panel B of Table 3 are consistent with both explanations: on the one hand,
borrowing more short-term debt in the years before the crises could have made the banks
that eventually failed more vulnerable to roll-over risk and ﬁnancial crisis. On the other
hand, adverse changes to asset quality or loan repayment schedules in these banks, which
would increase their likelihood of failing, could have led to more reliance on short term debt
on the part of these banks10. After 1997 however, banks which eventually survived increased
their debt maturity signiﬁcantly, while those that eventually failed relied on debt of much
shorter maturity. This suggests that even in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, market
participants could distinguish between banks of varying quality, implying that the observed
variation across banks is informative.
We next move to a simple analysis of the determinants of the maturity of the debt
obligations in our sample. We focus on foreign-currency denominated debt, i.e. debt issued
in a currency other than the bank’s domestic currency. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 4,
Panel A, present the results of OLS regressions in which debt maturity (in years) is regressed
on a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the issuing bank has failed according to our
deﬁnition, and zero otherwise. In the second column we add a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 if the obligation in question (mostly bonds and notes) was rated by Standard
& Poor’s. In both regressions we include year and country ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as an
interaction term of year with the failure dummy. We see that debt obligations taken by
failed banks were of shorter maturity, approximately 1.6 years lower on average relative to
obligations taken by banks which survived the crisis. Adding the bond rating dummy in the
second regression adds some explanatory power, but does not change the quantitative eﬀect.
We see that having a Standard & Poor’s rating is associated with a signiﬁcantly increased
bond maturity. The next two columns in Panel A of the table present the results of probit
regressions (marginal eﬀects are reported), where the dependent variable is the probability
that maturity is equal to or less than one and two years, respectively. We again include
year and country ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as an interaction term as before. The probit results
10In the case of Korea, Noland (2005) ascribes Korean banks’ increasing reliance on short-term debt in
the 1990s to the Korean government’s policy of discouraging long-term debt.
13shown here are consistent with the OLS regressions: the probability of a failed bank taking
on debt due one year or less from the date of issuance is 28% higher relative to a surviving
bank, taken at the sample mean. For debt due in two years or less, that probability is 40%
higher for failed banks relative to surviving banks, again taken at the sample mean. We see
here as well that a bond rated by Standard & Poor’s has a lower probability of having a
very short maturity, relative to non-rated obligations. These results of course are subject
to concerns about endogeneity, since bank failure may be driven by debt maturity. Indeed,
the results in Panel A are inherently unstable: in Panel B of the table we split the sample
to debt issued through 1997 (left two columns), and debt issued after 1997. We see that
in both OLS and probit speciﬁcations, the results change susbtantially. According to the
OLS speciﬁcation, debt obligations issued through 1997 by failed banks have a much shorter
maturity, almost six years less, relative to obligations issued by surviving banks. However,
the same speciﬁcation applied to obligations issued after 1997 shows a positive, and highly
signiﬁcant, association between failure and maturity. The probit regressions, applied to the
split sample, are also highly unstable: for debt issued through 1997, we now get a negative
association between likelihood of short maturity and failure, whereas for debt issued after
1997 we see an insigniﬁcant eﬀct. As already seen in Section 2, the relationship between
bank failure and maturity of debt issued by banks is likely to be complex. The regressions
shown in Table 4 illustrate that this is the case empirically as well.
In order to produce a more coherent analysis of bank failure and debt maturity, we
proceed to aggregate our debt data at the bank level, so that for our main analysis the unit
of observation is not a single obligation, as in Tables 3 and 4, but rather a bank-year pair.
For each bank in our dataset, and for each year from 1997-2002, we calculate the total debt
issued by the bank that matures in that year. In order to focus on the East Asian crisis, we
include only the years from 1997 onwards11. We then further separate the maturing debt by
year of origination. Thus we know the amount of debt of Bank i that is scheduled to mature
in year t, and that was originated in years t−1, t−2, t−3... and so on. This method creates
a snapshot of the bank’s exposure to roll-over risk at any given year, while keeping track of
the original maturity of the obligations involved. Moreover, we can relate this information
to other ﬁnancial characteristics of the bank in that given year, such as asset size and overall
11We do not observe any bank failures prior to 1997 in our sample.
14proﬁtability. Finally, recall from Table 1 that we have the year of failure for each bank in our
dataset. Our main regressions, therefore, will examine the eﬀect, for each bank-year pair, of
the bank’s characteristics and amount of maturing debt on the probability of failure in the
given year.
Table 5 presents summary statistics for size, proﬁtability, and roll-over exposure, where
the unit of observation is a bank-year pair. We have 114 such bank-year pairs in which the
bank failed in the given year, and 1,359 pairs in which the bank in question did not fail in
the given year. We see that a bank which failed in a given year was on average much large
and also signiﬁcantly less proﬁtable relative to a bank which did not fail. Banks who fail
in a given year are also in greater need of debt roll-over: expressed as a fraction of overall
assets, maturing debt which has originated at any time before 1997 is larger by a factor of
more than 3 compared with banks who did not fail, 2.8% and 0.8%, respectively. Banks
who fail exhibit, in the year of failure, a higher or equal ratio of maturing debt to overall
assets regardless of the year in which the debt was issued, as Table 5 shows, though the
mean diﬀerences are signiﬁcant only for maturing debt originating at any time before 1997
or 1995. Note that by excluding more recent debt issues, as we do in Table 5 when moving to
the right, we are able to observe banks’ exposure to roll-over risk that is wholly due to long
term obligations issued years before the crises. This will be key to our identiﬁcation strategy
for estimation, as explained more fully in the next section. Table 6 compares bank-year
pairs only for those banks who, in the given year, are exposed to roll-over risk, i.e. have
maturing debt. Note ﬁrst that a large minority (44%) of banks who failed in a given year,
were exposed to roll-over risk in the year of failure. In contrast, only a small fraction (9%)
of the banks who did not fail in a given year were exposed to such risk according to our
data. Secondly, the size and proﬁtability diﬀerences already observed are present in this
subgroup as well: failed banks were signiﬁcantly larger and less proﬁtable in the year of
failure. They were also relatively more exposed to short-term maturing debt: as the table
shows, both failed and non-failed banks were exposed to roll-over risk which was heavily
concentrated in obligationss which originated in 1994 or afterwards. However, the emphasis
on short-term debt was more pronounced among the failed banks, in the year of failure. The
diﬀerence appears particularly stark in the rightmost column, which shows that maturing
bebt originating before 1993 constituted only 1.7% of exposure for failed banks, compared
15with 6.3% for banks which did not fail in the given year.
4. Identiﬁcation and Estimation
Our identiﬁcation strategy is based on the idea that the original maturity of debt that is
currently due can be important in explaining bank failure only to the extent that the debt
is determined endogenously given the riskiness of the bank. According to this view accumu-
lation of long term debt that eventually becomes shorter term should not be correlated with
higher risk and likelihood of failure, since the decision to lend to the bank predates any news
on the soundness of the bank’s assets. In contrast, in models that predict that short term
debt increases the vulnerability to crises, the original maturity of the debt that is currently
due is not important; what matters for the vulnerability of the bank is the debt roll-over
regardless of its original maturity. In this paper we utilize our information on banks’ long
term obligations to determine which of the two stories ﬁts better with the data. The result-
ing coeﬃcient - the eﬀect of maturing long term debt on the probability of failure - provides
the best indicator available to gauge a bank’s roll-over risk, the crucial determinant of bank
failure according to the Chang and Velasco model. It is untainted by a possible endogenous
response to bad news, a response that would be consistent with the general shortening of
debt maturities in the 1990’s that we see in 3. Moreover, our data are comprehensive, in
that we have the universe of debt obligations issued by banks, going back to 1976. We also
have the full balance sheet information on the issuing banks, but we cannot account for
any oﬀ-balance-sheet transactions such as swaps; hedges of this sort seem to have played a
relatively minor role however, and were in any case secondary to foreign borrowing12. All
told, our measure of exposure to roll-over risk is superior to any that has been suggested in
the literature to date.
4.1. Baseline Regressions
We deﬁne an indicator variable that takes on the value of one when a bank i fails at year t
and zero otherwise. Using probit regressions we estimate diﬀerent variants of the following
12Furman and Stiglitz (1998) argue that derivatives served to make regulation more diﬃcult by disguising
banks’ and ﬁrms’ true exposure to risk.
16speciﬁcation:




where sizei,t denotes the logarithm of bank i’s book value of assets in year t, proﬁtabilityi,t
denotes bank i’s proﬁtability in year t (as measured by its return on assets), and debtY EAR
i,t
denotes banks i’s maturing debt obligations in year t (as a fraction of overall assets) that
originate before the speciﬁed year. For example, the variable debt97
i,t denotes debt obligations
that originate at any time before 1997 and mature in year t (as a fraction of bank i’s overall
assets in year t), therefore including both short and long term debt13. In contrast, the
variable debt94
i,t includes only maturing debt obligations that originate at any time before
1994, i.e excluding short-term debt, φ(k) is the standard normal density, and z = β1sizei,t+
β2profitabilityi,t + γdebtY EAR
i,t . Table 7 reports diﬀerent speciﬁcations of regression (9) and
displays marginal coeﬃcients (at the mean) for the explanatory variables. The displayed
t-statistics are calculated using standard errors that are clustered by country.
Through the table, each column reports a diﬀerent debt variable used in the regression,
ranging from debt97
i,t in the leftmost column to debt93
i,t in the rightmost column. In Panel A
we run the regressions without any ﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁnd that both size and proﬁtability
are highly signiﬁcant and robust to the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of debt included in each of the
regressions. As expected less proﬁtable banks were more likely to fail. Furthermore, larger
bank were more likely to fail during and immediately after the crisis, possibly indicative of
greater exposure by these banks to low quality assets, or of relatively high leverage. The
main point of interest however lies in the coeﬃcients of our short-term debt variables. These
exhibit a clear diﬀerence between the eﬀect of obligations of diﬀerent original maturities. As
we move from left to right, the regressions portrayed in the Table 7 include less and less
obligations that were originally issued as short-term debt. We ﬁnd that going back as far as
three years prior to the crisis, i.e. when we exclude obligations that originate in or after 1995,
we still get a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect. This eﬀect is both statistically and economically
signiﬁcant: for example, an increase of one standard deviation in maturing debt issued before
1997 increases the probability of failure by 67 basis points, which constitute an increase of
11 percentage points in the sample probability of failure, given at 6.07% (see Table 5). In
13Recall that our regressions include only foreign-currency denominated debt.
17contrast, debt that was issued in 1994 or before does not have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the probability of bank failure in this speciﬁcation. Debt issued before 1994, i.e. at least
four years before the crisis, comes in with a negative sign, although in this speciﬁcation the
eﬀect is imprecisely measured.
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results of these regressions, now including country and
year ﬁxed eﬀects. We see that the coeﬃcients for asset size are now smaller, as well as
insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcients for bank proﬁtability are almost unchanged. The coeﬃcients
for maturing debt which includes relatively short-term debt are not at all robust to the
inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects: they lose their statistical signiﬁcance, are much smaller, and in one
instance even change sign. On the other hand, the coeﬃcients for longer-term maturing debt
(i.e. debt issued before 1994) retain their negative signs, and moreover are now statistically
signiﬁcant. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in maturing debt issued before
1993, decreases the probability of bank failure by 43 basis point, corresponding to a seven
percentage point relative decrease. This negative eﬀect of longer-term maturing debt is
large, as well as precisely measured, and will be robust to other speciﬁcations, as we shall
see presently.
Given our identiﬁcation strategy, our ﬁndings in Table 7, in Panel B in particular, indicate
that roll-over risk in itself fails to explain bank failure. Recall that the direction of causality
with regards to short-term debt is ambiguous, so the apparent positive eﬀect of such debt
on the probability of failure in Panel A should not be taken at face value. With country
and year ﬁxed eﬀects, the apparent explanatory power of relatively short-term debt is much
reduced in any case. Long-term obligations, however, do not suﬀer from this ambiguity,
and it is therefore signiﬁcant that these obligations do not have a similar eﬀect. Indeed,
when ﬁxed eﬀects are included, these obligations negatively aﬀect the probability of failure,
a result completely at odds with the idea that roll-over risk was an important cause of bank
failure. Recall that according to Prediction 1, any maturing debt obligation, regardless of
original maturity, has a positive aﬀect on the probability of failure. This prediction fails
to hold in the case of debt issued before 1994, as Panel B of the table clearly shows. In
contrast, Prediction 1A does better: we see longer-term debt reducing probability of failure,
as would be the case if indeed weaker banks could only get short-term ﬁnancing, since in that
case banks ﬁnanced with relatively more longer-term debt are the stronger banks, the ones
18with less risky assets. We therefore conclude that to the extent that maturing, relatively
short term debt positively aﬀects the probability of failure, it does so above and beyond the
roll-over eﬀect, i.e beyond the mere fact that the debt is indeed maturing. The year 1994 is
the apparent threshold year, in that maturing debt issued prior to that year can be deemed
as non-contributory to bank failure.
It is interesting to see to what extent our results are sensitive to the particular method
used. We therefore also perform survival analysis on our bank data. In this method we
examine how the explanatory variables aﬀect a bank’s hazard function, i.e. the likelihood
of failure as a function of time passed since year 0, in this case 1996. We estimate the
regressions using the Cox proportional hazard model, which is semi-parametric and therefore
less restrictive than fully parametric estimation. Here we look at individual banks through
the period 1997 - 2002, and not at bank-year pairs as before. Another major diﬀerence
between the methods is in censoring: when estimating the likelihood of failure via probit,
we do not have to drop any post-failure observation, which may contain useful information
pertaining to the timing of failure. Survival analysis, however, does require us to drop
these observations. Our results are broadly similar, however, with diﬀerences mainly in
the statisitcal signiﬁcance of the various coeﬃcients, but with remarkably close estimates of
economic signiﬁcance. The results are given in Table 8: we see in Panel A, where we estimate
without ﬁxed eﬀects, that maturing debt which includes short-term debt, i.e. includes debt
issued in or after 1994, has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the likelihood of bank failure,
whereas maturing debt that does not include these short-term obligations has a negative
eﬀect, though not always signiﬁcant. Comparing these results to Panel A of Table 7, note
that the economic magnitudes we estimate are quite similar. In Panel B, where country
and year ﬁxed eﬀects are included, we see again that the coeﬃcients for maturing debt
which includes short-term debt are now smaller and in some cases less signiﬁcant, whereas
the coeﬃcient on pre-1993 debt is now statistically signiﬁcant. Here as well we note that
economic magnitudes are very similar, comparing these results to Panel B of Table 7.
195. Conclusion
Our ﬁndings can therefore be summarized as follows: to the extent that long-term debt which
is currently due represents roll-over risk without contamination by short-term expectations
regarding asset quality, we ﬁnd that roll-over risk does not in itself contribute to the likelihood
of failure of banks in our dataset. In other words, Prediction 1 in Section 2 is not borne
out by the evidence. Moreover, in some speciﬁcations, as we have seen, a higher fraction
of such debt out of overall assets actually reduces a bank’s probability of failure, a ﬁnding
which is hard to explain using only the maturity mismatch approach to explain bank failure.
These ﬁndings are, however, consistent with the alternative approach of Diamond and Rajan,
which explains bank failure on fundamentals, i.e. on the quality of banks’ underlying assets.
Prediction 1A in Section 2 accords quite well with our results: banks with relatively more
long term debt (where ”long term” turns out to mean pre-1994) are indeed less likely to fail.
We ﬁnd that banks with relatively more short-term debt are more likely to fail; however that
result should be viewed as a correlation rather than an eﬀect due to the issue of endogeneity.
It is important to emphasize, however, that our results cannot rule out the maturity mismatch
explanation out of hand, since we cannot properly identify the direction of causality for the
eﬀects of short-term debt. Our identiﬁcation strategy focuses on roll-over risk per se, and
rules out that as the sole, or even main, factor behind bank failure during and after the East
Asian ﬁnancial crisis.
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22Table 1: Bank Failures
This table provides descriptive statistics for East Asian banks included in our empirical analysis. See the main text for our deﬁnition of bank failure. The
table includes only those banks for which we have established outcome following the crisis.
Failed Banks As Failed Banks By Year of Failure (As Fraction of All Banks)
Country Fraction of All Banks 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Indonesia 52/119 (44%) 4 (3%) 20 (17%) 26 (22%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%)
Korea 49/60 (82%) 11 (18%) 12 (20%) 18 (30%) 5 (8%) 3 (5%) 0 (0%)
Malaysia 42/96 (44%) 1 (1%) 12 (13%) 5 (5%) 24 (25%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
The Philippines 10/56 (18%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 5 (9%) 3 (5%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%)
Thailand 59/80 (74%) 22 (28%) 20 (25%) 4 (5%) 0 (0%) 13 (16%) 0 (0%)
All Countries 212/411 (51%) 38 (9%) 65 (16%) 58 (14%) 33 (8%) 17 (4%) 1 (0%)Table 2: Issued Debt - Summary Statistics






Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Domestic US$ Other Foreign
Indonesia 315 52.6 45.1 3.7 2.4 38 (12%) 275 (87%) 2 (1%)
Korea 804 134.0 155.7 4.1 2.8 0 (0%) 635 (79%) 169 (21%)
Malaysia 137 127.4 103.1 3.9 3.6 82 (60%) 41 (30%) 14 (10%)
The Philippines 60 79.0 52.6 4.1 2.4 0 (0%) 56 (93%) 4 (7%)
Thailand 523 76.3 92.2 4.4 2.6 151 (29%) 338 (65%) 34 (7%)
All Countries 1839 101.4 123.9 4.1 2.7 271 (15%) 1345 (73%) 223 (12%)Table 3:
Original Maturity Issuance
Panel A: Original Maturity of Debt Issues 1976-2002
25th 75th Standard
Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min Max Observations
Failed banks 4.10 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.64 0.0 15.0 1,483
Non-failed banks 4.17 3.0 3.0 5.0 3.04 0.0 25.0 363
Diﬀerence -0.07
T-test (-0.47)
Panel B: Evolution of Original Maturity for Failed and Non-failed Banks Over Time
1980- 1991- 1992- 1995- May 1997- 1998- 1999- 2000-
1990 1997 1996 April 1997 2002 2002 2002 2002
Failed banks 6.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.9
(observations) (180) (1037) (829) (514) (345) (259) (243) (180)
Non-failed banks 4.8 4.2 4.6 4.3 3.6 3.8 4.7 5.3
(observations) (24) (239) (178) (129) (126) (97) (62) (50)
Diﬀerence 2.0 -0.3 -0.7 -0.4 -0.6 -0.9 -1.8 -2.4
T-test (2.86) (-1.83) (-3.56) (-1.64) (-2.02) (-2.58) (-4.48) (-5.15)Table 4: Original Maturity Regressions
The regressions presented in this table include only foreign-currency denominated debt obligations issued by banks
in our dataset. Failed equals 1 if the issuing bank has met the conditions for failure in any of the years 1997-2002.
Rated equals 1 if the debt obligation received a Standard and Poor’s rating. Estimation was performed by OLS and
probit (marginal eﬀects reported), as appropriate. t-statistics, calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by
year, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include year and country ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as an interaction term
of year with Failed.
Panel A: All Foreign - Denominated Debt
Dependent
Variable= Maturity Maturity Pr(Maturity≤1) Pr(Maturity≤2)
Failed -1.58 a -1.66 a 0.28 a 0.40 a
(-7.36) (-7.20) (21.59) (26.57)
Rated 1.79 a -0.07 b -0.15 a
(7.04) (-2.54) (-2.83)
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.33 0.16 0.20
Observations 1,568 1,568 1,492 1,492
Panel B: Comparisons of Obligations Issued Before and After Crisis
Debt Issued through 1997 Debt Issued after 1997
Dependent
Variable= Maturity Pr(Maturity≤2) Maturity Pr(Maturity≤2)
Failed -5.47 a -0.49 a 3.15 a -0.17
(-7.20) (-14.74) (3.02) (-1.26)
Rated 1.75 a -0.08 a 1.46 a -0.28 c
(5.29) (-2.73) (6.05) (-1.83)
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.12 0.27 0.15
Observations 1,315 1,213 253 253Table 5: Characteristics of Failed and Non-failed Banks
This table compares means of characteristics of banks that failed and banks that did not fail, in a particular year, during the East Asian crisis.
Observations here are bank-year pairs, for the years 1997-2002. Size is the dollar value of the bank’s assets, given current exchange rates.
Proﬁtability is deﬁned as return on assets (ROA). Long-term debt due this year is the dollar amount of long-term debt principal that is due in
the current year and was issued several years ago.
(Long-term Debt due this year)/Assets
issued issued issued issued issued
Size Proﬁtability pre 1997 pre 1996 pre 1995 pre 1994 pre 1993 Observations
Failed banks $11,926.1m -8.31% 2.74% 1.30% 0.49% 0.13% 0.02% 114
Non-failed banks $4,543.2m -.43% 0.79% 0.50% 0.14% 0.07% 0.02% 1,359
Diﬀerence $7,832.9m -7.88% 1.96% 0.80% 0.35% 0.06% 0.00%
T-test (6.55) (-8.25) (3.50) (1.77) (2.83) (1.02) (0.11)Table 6: Characteristics of Failed and Non-failed Banks with Maturing Debt
This table compares means of characteristics of failing and non-failing banks with maturing debt in a particular year, during the East Asian
crisis. Observations here are bank-year pairs, for the years 1997-2002. Size is the dollar value of the bank’s assets, given current exchange rates.
Proﬁtability is deﬁned as return on assets (ROA). Long-term debt due this year is the dollar amount of long-term debt principal that is due in
the current year and was issued several years ago.
(Long-term Debt due this year)/
(Long-term Debt due this year issued pre 1997)
issued issued issued issued issued Obs. with long-
Size Proﬁtability pre 1997 pre 1996 pre 1995 pre 1994 pre 1993 term debt issued
pre 1997 > 0
Failed banks $20,844.5m -9.13% 100% 59.80% 28.34% 11.06% 1.73% 50 (43.9%)
Non-failed banks $9,492.66m -2.46% 100% 69.68% 37.48% 12.44% 6.37% 133 (9.8%)Table 7: Short-term Debt and Bank Failure with Bank-Level Financial Controls
The dependent variable in the regressions is a dummy variable that equals 1 for failed banks in the year of failure. Size is
the log of the dollar value of the bank’s assets. Proﬁtability is deﬁned as return on assets (ROA). Debt maturing this year is
the principal amount of debt, issued before particular years, that is due in the current year, expressed as a fraction of overall
bank assets. All regressions include an intercept (not reported), panel B speciﬁcations include country and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
Regressions are estimated using probit (marginal eﬀects are reported). t-statistics, calculated using standard-errors that are
clustered by country, are reported in parentheses. Magnitudes are calculated relative to the observed probability of bank failure
in our sample, given at 6.07%
Panel A: Bank Failures
Dependent
Variable= Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure)
Size 0.017 a 0.016 a 0.017 a 0.016 a 0.017 a 0.017 a
(3.46) (3.41) (3.45) (3.41) (3.44) (3.38)
Proﬁtability -0.003 a -0.003 a -0.003 a -0.003 a -0.003 a -0.003 a
(-4.51) (-4.78) (-4.63) (-4.59) (-4.55) (-4.52)
Debt maturing 0.111 a 0.091 a 0.333 a -0.119 -2.147
this year (5.87) (4.81) (11.80) (-0.36) (-1.37)
issued pre1997 pre1996 pre1995 pre1994 pre1993
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Observations 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284
Magnitude of
the eﬀect Long-term debt due this year issued:
pre1997 pre1996 pre1995 pre1994 pre1993
one σ change 11.0% 6.6% 6.7% - -
Panel B: Bank Failures Fixed-eﬀects Regressions
Dependent
Variable= Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure)
Size 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 c
(1.54) (1.52) (1.55) (1.51) (1.63) (1.60)
Proﬁtability -0.002 a -0.002 a -0.002 a -0.002 a -0.002 a -0.002 a
(-15.18) (-15.57) (-15.15) (-15.44) (-15.22) (-15.23)
Debt maturing 0.029 -0.007 0.063 -0.309 c -2.027 a
this year (1.19) (-0.23) (1.21) (-1.93) (-2.49)
issued pre1997 pre1996 pre1995 pre1994 pre1993
Fixed-Eﬀects
Country and Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Observations 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284
Magnitude of
the eﬀect Long-term debt due this year issued:
pre1997 pre1996 pre1995 pre1994 pre1993
one σ change - - - -3.37% -7.02%Table 8: Hazard Regressions: Short-term Debt and Bank Failure
These regressions are estimated using the Cox semi-parametric maximum likelihood proportional hazard model. The dependent
variable is the annual probability of failure, i.e. the hazard function of time until failure, starting from 1996. Size is the log of
the dollar value of the bank’s assets. Proﬁtability is deﬁned as return on assets (ROA). Debt maturing this year is the dollar
amount of debt principal, issued before particular years, that is due in the current year, as a fraction of overall assets. Panel
B speciﬁcations include country ﬁxed-eﬀects. t-statistics, calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by country, are
reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Bank Failures
Dependent
Variable= Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure)
Size 0.340 a 0.335 a 0.337 a 0.334 a 0.344 a 0.344 a
(4.12) (4.35) (4.20) (3.87) (4.14) (4.06)
Proﬁtability -0.023 a -0.024 a -0.023 a -0.023 a -0.023 a -0.023 a
(-9.23) (-9.51) (-9.34) (-9.27) (-9.11) (-8.90)
Debt maturing 2.007 a 1.077 b 2.82 -5.054 b -28.005
this year (3.20) (2.32) (0.85) (-1.97) (-1.06)
issued pre1997 pre1996 pre1995 pre1994 pre1993
Observations 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462
Magnitude of
the eﬀect Maturing debt due this year issued:
pre1997 pre1996 pre1995 pre1994 pre1993
one σ change 12.26% 5.18% 4.80% -3.40% -
Panel B: Bank Failures Fixed-eﬀects Regressions
Dependent
Variable= Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure) Pr(Failure)
Size 0.152 b 0.154 b 0.151 b 0.149 b 0.154 b 0.157 b
(2.01) (2.00) (1.96) (1.96) (2.06) (2.05)
Proﬁtability -0.043 a -0.043 a -0.043 a -0.043 a -0.043 a -0.043 a
(-13.56) (-13.36) (-13.63) (-13.80) (-14.10) (-13.90)
Debt maturing 0.438 -0.488 3.014 a -2.666 -28.768 b
this year (0.74) (-0.41) (3.20) (-0.64) (-2.00)
issued pre1997 pre1996 pre1995 pre1994 pre1993
Fixed-Eﬀects
Country and Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462
Magnitude of
the eﬀect Maturing debt due this year issued:
pre1997 pre1996 pre1995 pre1994 pre1993
one σ change - - 3.01% - -6.57%